CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO (Brazil)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
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Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
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1. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the 457th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before I call on the first speaker, permit me to draw the attention of the Committee to document CCD/282, which contains the statement of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) on 5 March 1970.

3. Mr. HUSAIN (India): As I am taking the floor for the first time this session, I should like to take the opportunity to welcome our new colleagues -- the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Guerreiro; the representative of Japan, Ambassador Abe; the representative of Poland, Ambassador Natorf; and the representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu.

4. This session, beginning as it does on the threshold of the 1970s, is as it were the inauguration of the Disarmament Decade declared by the United Nations General Assembly last year. The wise words addressed to us by our Secretary-General, U Thant, (CCD/PV.450), who considered it important to visit us, not only underline the significance of this fact but should also serve as a reminder to us of how much of our task still remains to be accomplished. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) this Committee, while continuing its intensive work on negotiating agreements on collateral measures, is required --

> "...to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control ..." (CCD/275).

Furthermore, this "comprehensive programme" should "provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations." (ibid.)

5. Judging from the rather disappointing experience we have had with the Decade decreed by the international community in the sphere of economic development, we are convinced that a mere declaration of intent would be meaningless unless it were reinforced by an agreed programme for concrete action. Our broad objectives have been stated time and again in various General Assembly resolutions and declarations.

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It would seem, therefore, to my delegation that if we in this Committee, which we keep reminding ourselves and others is the world's principal forum for multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament, are to inaugurate the Disarmament Decade meaningfully and seriously, then our first essential task is to draw up -- providing, of course, for a degree of flexibility -- some order of priorities for what we are going to concentrate on until the next session of the General Assembly and in the subsequent years of the Disarmament Decade, maintaining, as suggested by the representative of Italy on 26 February, a balance between measures of disarmament and collateral measures (CCD/PV.453, para.8).

6. The Secretary-General, in his address to us on 18 February, observed that --

> "Elements of such a programme already exist in the two drafts of treaties for general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3), in the provisional agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in August 1968, and in resolution C adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in September 1968 (A/7277, pp.6, 7)." (CCD/PV.450, para.20)

But, as pointed out by the delegation of the United Arab Republic on 24 February, the programme should "not be a mere list of items pertaining to the cessation of the armaments race, disarmament or merely non-armament juxtaposed without sequence or interrelation". (CCD/PV.452, para.38) The Indian delegation is in full agreement with this view, and has repeatedly during the last two years urged the need for some order of priorities indicative of the political will to reach agreement, which alone could ensure an improved organization or better mechanics of work and higher output, the need for which has been stressed by a large number of delegations.

7. It would, I think, be more appropriate if in this Disarmament Decade we spent less time on recalling again and again the achievement in past decades of some non-armament measures -- principally the non-proliferation Treaty -- and instead began to consider seriously actual arms limitation and disarmament measures. Only then would the goal of general and complete disarmament look like a possibility attainable within the foreseeable future.

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8. While speaking of the Disarmament Decade, let me add that we have been reminded in the same General Assembly resolution once again that the ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament. The Indian delegation suggested in this Committee in 1968 (ENDC/PV.389, para.7) that progress in this regard would be facilitated if the United States and the Soviet Union were to submit, in the light of various suggestions which had been made and the many developments which had since taken place, revised versions of their draft treaties presented in 1962 (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3; ENDC/2/Rev.1). Many other delegations have since expressed a similar view in order that the Committee may have, in the words used in the Mexican working papers, "a realistic and effective basis for the work entrusted to it" (CCD/277, para.6). While this has so far not been done, we have however noted with great interest Mr. Roshchin's opening statement on 17 February, wherein he said that --

> "...the Soviet delegation deems it most necessary that the Committee should take up again the detailed consideration of the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which have already been submitted, and that it should endeavour to work out an agreed text." (CCD/PV.449, para.56)

We hope, therefore, that some progress can be made on the lines suggested by us before the next session of the General Assembly.

9. This would seem imperative, as has already been stressed by several delegations, because world military expenditure has sharply increased from $120,000 million in 1962 to $200,000 million in 1969. The Secretary-General, in his address to this Committee on 18 February, observed that --

> "This unproductive and wasteful diversion of the world's resources and energy exacted a heavy toll on the living conditions of the peoples of the world in both the developing and the developed countries." (CCD/PV.450, para.10)

In this connexion it may be pointed out that the SIPRI Year Book of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968/69 (p.29) has drawn attention to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union accounted for some 70 per cent of world military expenditure in 1968, and between them accounted for 80 per cent of the rise in world military expenditures between 1965 and 1968. So it would seem more than ever necessary that, in order to curtail world military expenditure, our first priority should be measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

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10. There is another important aspect of the problem of general and complete disarmament which has been raised and which deserves our earnest consideration. Mr. Roshchin, in his statement on 17 February, said that --

> "In asserting the need to proceed to the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we should like to stress that such a treaty can be concluded only with the participation of the maximum number of militarily-important States, and in the first place of all the nuclear Powers." (CCD/PV.449, para.58)

The Secretary-General, in his statement on 18 February, also said that --

> "...serious attempts should be made to obtain the participation of all the nuclear Powers in all efforts for disarmament. The active co-operation of all of them is essential for a full measure of success." (CCD/PV.450, para.24)

11. We agree with these observations, and would be interested to know what steps have been taken or are proposed to associate France and the People's Republic of China with nuclear and other disarmament talks. Unless some steps are taken towards this end, the present stalemate on various important disarmament questions will continue, as also, for a greater part of the world, the unreality of some of the agreements on measures of non-armament that we take pride in having concluded. The challenge of the Disarmament Decade calls for a proper perspective, appropriate priorities and urgent action in this regard.

12. In its resolution 2602 A (XXIV), which my delegation co-sponsored, the General Assembly expressed the hope that bilateral negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems would bring about early and positive results which would pave the way for further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. In view of "the grave dangers involved in the development of new nuclear weapons through a spiralling nuclear arms race", to which our attention has been drawn by General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), it is the hope of my delegation that the appeal to the Governments of the USSR and the United States contained in General Assembly resolution 2602 A (XXIV), "to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems", is receiving the serious consideration of both Governments. In

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this connexion let me recall that the Secretary-General, in his address to this Committee on 18 February, said that --

"...if the two parties could agree, pursuant to the appeal of the General Assembly, to a moratorium on the further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems, this would be the single most important first step to prevent the escalation of the nuclear arms race." (CCD/PV.450, para.23)

13. The delegation of India has appreciated the effort of the representative of the United States to inform the Committee, to the extent which he found possible, of what transpired at the first round of the bilateral talks held at Helsinki (CCD/PV.449, paras.18-20). We note, however, with some concern that the talks will relate to strategic nuclear arms only and will not cover all nuclear arms; as it would seem that a distinction has been made between nuclear weapons which are strategic and those which are non-strategic. Perhaps in the latter category would fall the so-called tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. To make such a distinction among nuclear weapons in the context of disarmament negotiations might well turn out to be unfortunate, because all nuclear weapons have basically the same characteristics and are equally dangerous. The world community has over the years called for urgent measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and has never implied that the strategic nuclear arms race should be stopped while the tactical nuclear arms race should be continued.

14. It has been stated here that the strategic arms limitation talks are the result of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty; but it is difficult to accept the view, because the need for those talks was felt by the two main nuclear Powers quite independently of the non-proliferation Treaty. Also, while recognizing that the subject-matter of those talks is related to the test-ban issue, it is difficult to accept the view that, pending their successful conclusion, we in this Committee cannot make any progress relating to the comprehensive test ban or other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session was fully aware of the commencement of the United States-Soviet bilateral talks; and indeed it adopted resolution 2602 A (XXIV) pertaining to them, at the same time

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as it adopted resolution 2604 B (XXIV) asking this Committee to deal with the question of a comprehensive test ban as a matter of urgency and to submit a special report to the next session of the General Assembly.

15. At the last session of our Committee we devoted, on the initiative of the Canadian delegation (ENDC/244), considerable time and thought to the consideration of the question of a world-wide exchange of seismological data to facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Those efforts resulted in General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV), which has asked the Secretary-General to make certain enquiries and to transmit the result of those enquiries to this Committee. The Government of India has offered its fullest co-operation in terms of the statement of the Indian delegation contained in document ENDC/261 of 14 August 1969. We shall eagerly await the report of the Secretary-General before expressing our further views on this matter.

16. Resolution 2604 B (XXIV), for which the initiative was taken by the Swedish delegation, requires this Committee "to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests", and "to submit a special report to the Assembly on the results of its deliberations". Unless some new proposals are made here we shall need to take up urgently the Swedish draft treaty (ENDC/242) placed before us last year and to discuss substantively the issue of verification and control, continuing differences over which between the two main nuclear-weapon Powers have been holding up progress for so many years. It has already been mentioned that, since the average number of nuclear-weapon tests has increased since the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was concluded, it is a matter of urgency to put an end to such tests.

17. Connected with the question of the comprehensive test ban is that of the utilization by all States of the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. My delegation agrees with the view expressed by the Swedish delegation on 18 February that our Committee should take up the question of --

> "...an independent international instrument which would contain the rules for a non-discriminatory access by all States to the technology of nuclear explosions and a regulation of the utilization by any State of such nuclear explosions." (CCD/PV.450, para.45)

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18. Regarding chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, we need not dwell on matters which have already been under discussion for several years and on which we are all agreed, namely (i) strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI); (ii) the need for all States which have not done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol without delay, preferably in 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations; and (iii) that in the consideration of further steps nothing should be done which might in any way diminish or detract from the continuing validity and importance of the Geneva Protocol.

19. Regarding the recommendation of the Secretary-General (ibid., p.xii) that the General Assembly should make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future, about which the views of the Indian delegation were expressed in some detail at our meeting on 19 August 1969 (ENDC/PV.429, paras.11 et seq.), it is a matter of deep satisfaction that the General Assembly has in its resolution 2603 A (XXIV), which was adopted with only three dissenting votes -- only two of which were those of parties to the Protocol -- reaffirmed the comprehensive nature of the Geneva Protocol. In the First Committee the Indian delegation expressed the view that --

> "... it is neither possible nor desirable that to meet the military doctrine or military requirements of any State, whether it is or is not a party to the Protocol, any exception should be made to the comprehensive prohibition of all chemical agents envisaged under the Geneva Protocol and recognized rules of international law." (A/C.1/PV.1706, provisional, p.18)

20. I may add that no existing or prospective party to the Protocol can, with a view to excluding harassing or incapacitating chemical agents from the prohibition under the Protocol, legitimately make a distinction between lethal and non-lethal chemical agents. There is a grave risk in allowing the use in war of CS or any kind of gas, because of the danger of escalation leading to the use of other gases. It is simpler and more practical to observe the principle: "No gases". That principle

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appears to have been well understood by the leaders of both sides in the Second World War, during which neither lethal nor the so-called non-lethal gases were employed though both sides had ample stocks of them. At the outbreak of the war both sides exchanged assurances that they would observe the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Those who entered the war later did the same.

21. It is erroneous, in our view, to think that the use of tear gas in warfare is intended to save lives and is therefore more humane than the use of conventional weapons. The degree of harmfulness to man, in any event a virtually undefinable term, is irrelevant. For one thing, there is the problem of the vast increase of dosage that inevitably occurs with any military use. In military operations there is no way of administering a certain chemical material at a given level to some persons without giving ten or a hundred times that level to others. Under conditions of military use there are no completely non-lethal or non-permanently-disabling chemical agents.

22. Taking into account their over-all effect, it is a myth that tear gas can be used in war to save lives. A good deal of tear gas was used in the First World War but not to save lives. Hitler's Germany produced, but did not use, a large quantity of tear gas munitions during the war, certainly not to save lives. It is hardly humane to put a soldier out of action with the use of CS and then kill him with some kind of conventional explosive. It would be impossible to control such use of tear gas on the battlefield. It may be possible theoretically to make a distinction between lethal and so-called non-lethal chemical agents; it would clearly be impossible to do so in war, because we have in warfare no enforcement mechanism.

23. Furthermore, in the past when lethal chemical agents were used extensively, the use of tear gas always preceded resort to lethal gases. When one uses certain chemical agents in combat or makes any other kind of exception to the Geneva Protocol, one is engaging in chemical warfare; and this would undoubtedly lead to retaliation in kind and therefore to more chemical warfare. Such a possibility could serve to stimulate military interest in warfare in many countries, leading to more and more sophistication and development, and result in a build-up of a more varied chemical capability around the world. In this building-up of chemical capability it would become impossible to maintain the finer distinction between the various degrees of lethality of chemical agents. It would be unfortunate if the application of the existing and future knowledge of biochemistry to military purposes should open up a new dimension of warfare that otherwise might remain closed.

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24. It is the view of my delegation that, as the Geneva Protocol has firmly closed the door against the use of all chemical and biological agents without exception, our Committee should now concern itself only with the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) and endeavour to reach agreement in order to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of nations. Before we examine the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries in New York (A/7655) or the draft convention submitted last year by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/255/Rev.1) to this Committee, particularly in view of the divergent views expressed by the Soviet Union and the United States, we need to clarify at this stage whether the draft convention or conventions we propose to elaborate should deal only with bacteriological (biological) weapons or with bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons separately or with bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons together.

25. On this issue the views of the Indian delegation were stated in clear terms at our meeting on 19 August 1969 (ENDC/PV.429, para.24) as well as in New York (A/C.1/PV.1706, provisional, p.22), so I will not take up the time of the Committee by repeating them. But I would like to say that we cannot accept the view that, because chemical weapons have on certain occasions been used in warfare and a number of countries have a chemical-warfare capability or are conducting research in this field, and of those countries some may wish to maintain chemical-weapons programmes to discourage the use against them of chemical warfare and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails -- so the argument runs --, we should confine our efforts to a ban on bacteriological (biological) weapons only.

26. It is not possible either for us to agree to separate treatment of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons on the ground that chemical weapons are for tactical use whereas bacteriological (biological) weapons are for strategic purposes; they are both weapons of mass destruction, and neither the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1) nor the report of the World Health Organization[1/] makes any distinction.

1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970.

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27. Having concluded this statement of our views on chemical and biological weapons, I should now like to speak about the sea-bed draft treaty. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 F (XXIV) we are required to take into account all the proposals and suggestions made at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and to submit to its next session the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The views of the Indian delegation regarding the joint draft CCD/269 submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union were expressed at our meeting on 21 October 1969 (CCD/PV.444, paras.39-52), and regarding the revised joint draft CCD/269/Rev.1 in the First Committee on 1 December 1969 (A/C.1/PV.1706, provisional, pp.23-30), so I will not reiterate these here. Suffice it to say at this stage that on the basis of working papers submitted in New York by the delegations of Sweden, Mexico, Canada, Brazil and Argentina, and any other suggestions that might be made here, negotiations should be undertaken to prepare a further revised draft for the consideration of this Committee before it is submitted to the next session of the General Assembly.

28. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Today I intend to deal with the subject which many delegations which have spoken so far have characterized as the most urgent one on our agenda, the question of chemical and biological weapons. This Committee is under a mandate from the General Assembly of the United Nations to try to reach agreement on further prohibitions in this field. The mandate is comprehensive:

> "... to submit a report on progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session". (resolution 2603 B (XXIV))

29. Before turning to what is the main theme of my intervention, namely the possibility of further prohibitions on production, stockpiling, etc., of these weapons, I feel compelled to deal for a moment with the already-existing prohibition of the use of chemical and biological agents in international armed conflicts. The reason is the public statement made by the British Government

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recently on their interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI), a statement which was referred to at some length by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, in his intervention on 19 February. At the end of this part of his statement Lord Chalfont said --

> "... that the Committee would be doing itself a disservice if it devoted time and attention to seeking to outlaw a substance like CS at the expense of concentrating on the whole range of lethal weapons of war in national arsenals." (CCD/PV.451, para.21).

30. This will of course not happen, as the use in war of CS -- which is a tear gas, whatever other names you attach to it -- is already prohibited under the generally-recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol. The relevant factor in connexion with the prohibition of the use in war of a substance like CS is certainly not its physical appearance as smoke but its physiological effects on man. The tear gases are intended to affect an adversary directly, whereas smoke -- the use of which in warfare is not prohibited by international law -- is a substance intended mainly for hiding, that is for protecting oneself.

31. It is somewhat disconcerting, moreover, to hear the distinction "lethal" -- "non-lethal" being introduced again. The Geneva Protocol makes no such distinction; and solid reasons have been offered why all these means should be considered in one spectrum, reasons which we have heard reiterated today by the representative of India and which have been well known and valid since the 1920s. That the vast majority of parties to the Geneva Protocol interpret the existing legal situation as constituting a total ban on chemical and bacteriological warfare was made quite clear by the vote in the General Assembly on resolution 2603 A (XXIV) and the debate in the First Committee which preceded that vote. No party to the Geneva Protocol had then or earlier sought to change its scope. Existing reservations concern only its applicability to first use and to non-parties.

32. What has since happened is a change in the position of one party to the Protocol, the British Government, purporting to establish a unilateral reinterpretation of the scope of the existing prohibition. However, no formal reservation or proposal for an amendment to the Protocol has so far been made by the British or any other Government party to the Treaty; if it were, other parties would probably feel

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compelled to react formally. The United Kingdom statement is most regrettable. It is particularly so since it comes from a Government which in the past as well as in the present has shown such positive interest in getting ahead with further arms-regulation measures in the field of biological and chemical warfare.

33. I will now turn to the main subject of this intervention: the further prohibitions -- on development, production, stockpiling, etc. -- that we should seek in connexion with chemical and biological weapons. When applying our energy and ingenuity to this task it is, I submit, useless to argue in an abstract way for or against simultaneous treatment of both chemical and biological means of warfare. This leads either to exercises like those of the theological hairsplitting in the Middle Ages, or to a strict division of supporters along traditional political lines.

34. The most sensible way to embark on our task to try to arrive at further prohibitory measures would seem to me to be, instead, first to analyse from a substantive point of view how far it is feasible to treat chemical and biological weapons together or to what extent it is necessary to give them separate treatment. From such an alalysis we shall be able to conclude, without any difference of opinion, whether we need to frame the prohibitions in one or two or more treaties, or whether we might perhaps have one over-all convention with separate treatment of some types of chemical and biological warfare agents in separate articles. We should, after such an analysis, be able to utilize to the utmost the constructive efforts which have already been made, as evidenced by the two available draft conventions, the British one (ENDC/255/Rev.1), and that put forward in the United Nations by nine socialist delegations (A/7655).

35. The former deals only with biological weapons, as we know. We must therefore examine if, and how, it could be applied to chemical weapons. It also seeks to include a prohibition against the use of bacteriological means of warfare, thus duplicating the Geneva Protocol -- an unnecessary and perhaps, because it is confined to biological weapons, even a risky undertaking. On the other hand, the draft submitted by the socialist delegations which, without taking up again the question of use, seeks to deal with chemical and biological weapons simultaneously is rather general. A number of technical problems involved will make their appearance when we study it further.

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36. When attempting to compare chemical and biological weapons as to common or particular characteristics we must perforce look for such possible differences as may be of relevance in connexion with a future treaty. From a purely material point of view many agents that can be used for warfare purposes have, of course, specific qualities. We should concentrate, however, on those differences which are relevant in our efforts at seeking further comprehensive prohibitions, or which may give rise to different claims on the needs for verification. The underlying overall reason for this search for relevant distinctions is that any treaty language has to be made quite concrete and spell out clearly the obligations called for.

37. Although an agreement about further prohibitions may only have to refer, as the United Nations resolution does, to certain activities, such as acquisition, stockpiling and destruction of chemical and biological weapons, I intend to make a rapid survey of the longer series of activities, starting with research and including, for instance, transfers and testing, in order to try to pinpoint where similarities or dissimilarities of substances call for special considerations. This matter is a little complicated and I have asked for my statement to be circulated quite early so that the members of the Committee may follow it more easily.

38. In regard to research, there is one marked common feature which will persist for the future, namely that many of the agents which can be used as a base for chemical and biological weapons are among those which are and will continue to be the object of basic research for various peaceful purposes. Thus, in the case of biological agents, research will be needed for gaining ever more knowledge of the origin of the diseases they cause and the contagion risks, as well as for the development of protective devices, particularly vaccines. In regard to chemical agents there is the same kind of demand for knowledge for producing protective measures, but also -- in regard to certain categories -- for the development of positively useful drugs, insecticides, herbicides, etc.

39. However, we must seek to establish the points at which such perfectly legitimate research may deviate into development with the aim of constructing means of warfare. The scope of a research project would then have to be redefined and the laboratory facilities specialized if the aim were to construct weapons. If so intended, the laboratories would need special equipment such as chambers for studying aerosols and

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safety devices for handling extremely toxic substances or highly infectious micro-organisms. From a technical point of view the difference between peaceful purposes and those connected with weapons manufacture should be quite clear. The scientific agencies responsible for research must obviously well know where the line goes, that is where research for peaceful purposes passes into research aiming at constructing warfare agents. It is also most interesting to observe the mounting concern among scientists and technical workers with the ethical problem they face in connexion with this latter type of chemical and biological research.

40. From a verification point of view it is necessary to state that, unless told that some laboratories were used for military purposes, one would be unlikely to be able to tell them apart from well-equipped laboratories for studying, for instance, air pollution, drugs or vaccines. While the research facilities themselves thus offer few and uncertain possibilities of monitoring from the outside the purposes they serve, whether peaceful uses or not, some pertinent information can now be culled from open scientific publications. To facilitate verification or to express it positively, to allay suspicions as to possible chemical and biological warfare research, great emphasis must be laid on open information. Where research is listed as "classified", particularly by a government agency or under a government contract, suspicion is easily aroused, of course. I think it can thus be said of research that work on chemical and biological agents shows the same general features. Research with regard to both these types of agents will most probably have to be exempted from prohibition as well as from obligatory verification.

41. But in regard to development work on weapons ready for application in war, the situation is somewhat different. Although much less is known, it is evident from the Secretary-General's report of last year on chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare (A/7575/Rev.1) that comprehensive work has been performed in several countries to develop warfare agents and also devices for the dissemination of those agents. This work includes preparing instructions and manuals as well as performing regular training in handling chemical and biological weapons for warfare purposes. Such development work, as well as training, could be prohibited unconditionally. Again, although the forms of devices will vary in many ways, the prohibition of such development work may well be dealt with in one comprehensive treaty. Only with regard

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to the verification aspect may such differences exist as would call for separate treatment. That question is closely related to the aspect of production of chemical and biological agents, to which I will return shortly.

42. Testing is another activity which has to be considered. Because of the secrecy and the dangerous nature of such trials, particularly when undertaken in respect of possible use in aerosol attacks, testing will have to take place in remote areas and at comparatively large testing sites containing a number of technical facilities and safety arrangements. It would seem to be possible to prohibit simultaneously the testing of chemical and biological warfare agents. For the purpose of verification some useful leads might be derived from surveillance of the site of and the security arrangements for testing areas; while in order to provide more conclusive evidence different techniques for various chemical and biological means of warfare might have to be foreseen.

43. Production of chemical and biological means of warfare is of course the main activity at which international prohibitions have to be directed. Here the problems become more complex. Chemical and biological agents cannot always be treated similarly. The relevant question is connected with the purpose of their production. In that respect a crucial difference makes itself felt in regard to certain agents production of which is possible for peaceful purposes as well as for warfare.

44. Biological agents obviously lend themselves practically wholesale to unconditional prohibition. Some exceptions will have to be made, however, as I have already mentioned under research, for quantities needed for further laboratory work and for developing protective substances, particularly vaccines.

45. Unconditional prohibition is also possible for a long series of chemical agents. Production of such chemical agents as nerve gases and toxins might be unconditionally prohibited and could therefore be coupled with biological agents in an international agreement. The road divides at a certain point, however. That is related to the fact that some specific chemical agents have a legitimate use in peaceful activities which would have to be recognized in any future convention. With that problem in mind we have to discuss the need for a separation into two categories of prohibition -- what I have called unconditional and conditional prohibitions.

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46. To illustrate this situation it might be useful to discuss the herbicides. Different kinds of these substances are used extensively all over the world to increase the yield of crops. They are also used in big quantities in forestry and gardening and for aquatic weed control. The method of their application is a highly-developed technique which concerns the right choice of agent, of plants to be eliminated and of the proper time for action. Without these very discerningly performed applications of herbicides -- and also of pesticides -- the food situation in the world today would be even worse than it is. Another important civilian application is to free certain areas such as roadsides, tracts under power lines, railway lines and airports from unwanted vegetation. That sort of more indiscriminate use also has some military applications, such as freeing fortifications and military airfields of vegetation.

47. In order to establish boundary lines in an international treaty between such production of certain chemical agents as I have just mentioned and production for direct warfare purposes, one would probably have to resort to what I have called "conditional prohibition", or prohibition with partial restraints. Technically the problem might be dealt with either in one comprehensive treaty with specified exemptions or in a separate treaty or protocol, where the restraining conditions could then be spelt out in more detail.

48. Undoubtedly we have to foresee that it might be more difficult to get international agreement on which chemical agents to exempt than on the prohibition of biological agents in general and on the considerably larger series of lethal and otherwise potently toxic chemical agents. Luckily, we could at least to a certain extent probably be aided in our search for such a selective prohibition by the fact that in recent years some of the substances used, for instance, as herbicides and pesticides have actually been found to have such considerable negative side-effects, involving short- or long-term risks to the health of man, animal or useful vegetation, that they have been put under stringent regulations. Although such prohibitory regulations belong within the competence of national legislation and differ considerably from country to country, I believe we should be able internationally to strive gradually towards agreement that such agents as are generally excluded from civilian use could be automatically included in a treaty of unconditional international prohibition.

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49. Distinguishing between unconditional and conditional prohibition means that for the chemical agents the coverage in a ban on production would have to be somewhat less extensive than in a ban on use. But, of course, "conditional prohibition" nevertheless has a connotation of prohibition. As to the verification aspect, I suggest as a point for further discussion that, while for all agents under "unconditional prohibition" the most effective means of verification which are generally acceptable should be sought, for those other cases of chemical agents it may suffice instead to prescribe a procedure of obligatory reporting to some international agency on their production, stockpiling and civilian use.

50. Finally, the production of the other parts of a weapons system, that is the means of dissemination of the agents, such as shells, bombs and sprayers, creates additional problems. Production of some components, and particularly vehicles used for the dissemination of chemical weapons, might be identical with, or anyway sufficiently similar to and hence integrated with, the production in general of conventional weapons. For biological weapons there will, however, probably be special arrangements, easier to identify. But by and large it is not so much the production of the elements of dissemination devices which becomes the crucial point; rather it is the weaponizing proper: that is, the process of combining the agents with their delivery vehicles.

51. That problem is in turn connected with that of storing. The larger bulk of the chemical agents would seem to require larger storing facilities. Chemical agents can, further, be loaded in advance into the different types of ammunition. Such storing may, however, be spread out geographically. Biological agents, which are comparatively sensitive micro-organisms, may not withstand storing under the same conditions as the chemical agents. Probably their production and their dissemination would have to be close in time to ensure full effectiveness. For storing during longer periods, freezing techniques may have to be used. Such storing would not be very conspicuous, as the amounts would be much smaller than in the case of for instance, chemical agents. The observability of storing is thus quite different for chemical and biological agents. This last conclusion also seems valid for the problems of transportation of the agents.

52. A special problem which will become highly pertinent in relation to an international treaty is that of trade, that is transfers between countries. A

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rule of thumb would seem to be to follow similar conclusions to the ones which we have discussed in relation to research and production: that is, unconditional prohibitions would be valid for all biological agents of warfare and for an increasing number of chemical agents. In regard to verification, certain rules as to reporting to some international agency or agencies would seem to be warranted. This must relate to all agents which might be used as means of warfare.

53. The question of elimination of existing stocks through destruction or decontamination should also be dealt with. The technical problems raised are considerably different here as between chemical and biological weapons. Elimination of existing large stocks of chemical agents may require operations on an industrial scale. Not only the agents themselves but also the residual products require special handling. The method of sinking them into the sea or in the depths of the earth is becoming of grave concern from a safety point of view.

54. Biological agents are as a rule easier to dispose of. This is primarily so because there is no need to annihilate the substances; it suffices to destroy their biological structure. Heating and different kinds of chemical interaction may be sufficient.

55. The conclusion seems to follow that, while destruction or decontamination of chemical and biological weapons may be prescribed under a general prohibitory rule, the technically-separate types of treatment required seem to call for different modalities if the destruction is to be verified.

56. In the preliminary analysis I have just made I wanted to demonstrate that several problems are common to the two types of weapons but also that some differ. Although those that differ are mainly technical problems, they may influence the content of any attempted treaty, particularly the solution of the verification problems. In this context I should mention that I have not set out to deal directly with the issue of verification today; but it does make itself felt whatever aspect one wishes to treat in concreto. The subject of verification is discussed in great depth in Part IV of the SIPRI study on chemical and biological warfare which has recently been sent to delegations by that Institute.

57. My statement today should be interpreted as part of the mapping expedition that I suggested in my earlier intervention on 18 February (CCD/PV.450, para.53) as a working method for the Committee at this stage of our deliberations on the matter

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of chemical and biological weapons. It should be understood that the tentative conclusions that I have been drawing as I have proceeded with the analysis of how to deal with chemical and biological agents respectively do not represent any firm position of my delegation in regard to the question whether our Committee should work out one comprehensive treaty, such as exists in regard to the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological warfare, or two or perhaps even several separate treaties on the wide complex of prohibiting also development, production, stockpiling, etc. in this field. It seems possible to deal with them together to a considerable extent, while in relation to the production of certain chemical agents treaty language would have to be considerably more specific.

58. One of our conclusions is firm, however — the main one — : that it is necessary for the Committee to take up the whole complex for simultaneous consideration leading to simultaneous solutions. It is the duty of our Committee to arrive at international agreements of the widest possible coverage in order to satisfy mankind's quest for safety in regard to these fearsome weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction.

59. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): In my capacity as representative of Brazil, let me first of all express my gratitude to all speakers who have addressed kind words of welcome to me. For my part, I should like to be associated with the greetings addressed to the representatives of Poland, Romania, Japan, Mongolia and Morocco.

60. I do not intend to go beyond the stage of preliminary comments in this first statement on the tasks that are on our agenda for the present session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We cannot fail to recognize that all our efforts have to be geared to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control; nor can we ignore the feelings of the community of nations as expressed in the resolutions of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly (CCD/275).

61. Among those resolutions probably the most comprehensive is that which proclaimed the Disarmament Decade (resolution 2602 E (XXIV)). It is perfectly clear that neither the General Assembly nor this Committee ever started its consideration of this question on the assumption that there exist magic deadlines or rigid schedules.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

That decision means, however, that stress should be laid upon efforts to attain disarmament as a broad objective which should be pursued with priority and constant striving by Member States. It undoubtedly justifies the study requested of this Committee for submission to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, which should contain suggestions, plans and guidelines for action. It should not be an attempt to seek a rhetorical formulation, which would end in frustration, nor the pursuit of too detailed schedules for the conclusion of concrete undertakings, which would be unrealistic. Indeed, it must mean a decision to rededicate ourselves to our task with greater clarity of programmes and directives. Without any intention of being the advocate of original or definitive suggestions, I believe that action should be pursued along some of the following lines with regard to the Decade.

62. First, some principles which form the guidelines for action in the field of disarmament could be complemented, while at the same time further directives could be elaborated with a view to adding precision to some fundamental concepts.

63. We also find useful the suggestion that has already been put forward here to promote the revision of the co-Chairmen's proposals for general and complete disarmament under effective international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1; ENDC/30 and Add.1-3 since they were presented in 1962.

64. A third category of action could well be the setting-up and actual carrying out of specific measures of nuclear disarmament, without prejudice to collateral measure with a view to bringing about practical results in the field of nuclear disarmament, which so far has been considered a priority matter only in theory and in words. Such results should be obtained, however, without harming the interests of non-nuclear-weapon countries and in such a way as to liberate resources for employment in programmes of economic and social development, especially in developing countries.

65. The Disarmament Decade implies of necessity a considerable effort, which goes beyond the competence of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but has to be taken into account by this Committee and to be stimulated by it. I refer to the range of measures that can lead to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the economic development of the less-developed countries of the world.

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66. For all those reasons we think that this Committee should be ready to devote a substantial part of its time to seeking a flexible planning of its goals and to reiterating emphatically its objectives in the field of disarmament. This new programme should lead us beyond the stage of preserving unarmed regions from the emplacement of arms or of disarming unarmed countries.

67. In those circumstances the Brazilian Government has followed with sustained interest the evolution of the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic weapons which are due to continue soon in Vienna. It would be futile to stress the deep political significance of such talks; since in this very room several speakers have done so with great precision and eloquence. On the other hand, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by resolution 2602 A (XXIV), has expressed the hope that "early and positive results" may be arrived at, and has appealed to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States "to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems."

68. As original co-sponsors of this resolution we wish to reiterate our hope that the parties to this bilateral dialogue will take this appeal into consideration. As members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we look forward to the promising results that might follow dynamic and fruitful interaction between the strategic arms limitation talks and the work undertaken here, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. Finally, as members of the community of nations, we hope that in the forthcoming substantive stage the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to live up to the great expectations that now exist and that they will reach vitally important results both in the realm of arms limitation and control and in the field of actual disarmament.

69. I should not like to be misinterpreted as putting less emphasis than they deserve on the issues on which it seems most likely that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will make progress in the short run. We attach considerable importance to those issues. I wish to single out first the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare.

70. The content of resolution 2603 (XXIV), which was given some consideration by members of this Committee during its session last autumn, is an important step forward

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in this field, since it declares the proscription of the use of such weapons in international conflicts. In the same positive direction is the valuable unilateral decision of the Government of the United States to halt production and do away with stockpiles of biological weapons. We believe that this initiative augurs well for the prompt conclusion of an international instrument in this field.

71. We have before us several important documents which are being closely examined by my Government and by all members of this Committee and which could form the basis for reasonable agreement. I do not intend at this juncture to give an absolute and a priori opinion on the scope of the treaty or treaties to be arrived at. However, I want to make it clear that we favour an effort towards the attainment of the broadest scope that may be sought in the process of negotiation. We understand that at the present stage we shall be faced with greater complexities and more difficult questions, since we are now dealing with a ban on the production and stockpiling of those weapons. That is why two very delicate aspects have to be kept in mind: the necessity of setting up adequate control procedures, which need not, however, be too elaborate, and non-interference with peaceful research and production.

72. The underground nuclear-weapon test ban, despite being quite an old subject, is nevertheless a very important objective. We have co-operated in all earnestness to attain it and still are very much interested in it. We are also very keen to consider all suggestions that have been presented over the years in order to make at least some progress. We expect the information to be supplied by all Member States of the United Nations to the Secretary-General according to operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2604 A (XXIV), to give a clearer picture of a technically-efficient and politically-viable system of verification -- a possible system. We also hope to see above all the strengthening of the political will to make progress in this field.

73. As to the treaty for the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the Brazilian positions are well known. I do not intend to repeat them now. On this subject we took note with considerable interest of the declaration made by the representative of the United States of America that questions of the definition of the area in which the treaty would be applied and of the verification procedures "touch on concerns of

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importance to many countries" (CCD/PV.449, para.22), and of his promise that "During this session we shall give sympathetic consideration to suggestions for accommodating those concerns." (ibid.)

74. Note should also be taken of the declaration of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics about proposals relating to the treaty. He said:

> "The Soviet delegation is carefully studying these proposals. We believe that in considering the draft treaty on the sea-bed the Committee should, in accordance with the appeal of the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolution 2602 F (XXIV),
>
> '... take into account all the proposals and suggestions that have been made at the present session of the General Assembly ...' "

(ibid., para.52)

75. With regard to parts C and D of resolution 2602 (XXIV), I feel that the Committee should probably study the best way of obtaining adequate technical and scientific information before starting any discussion on the implications of those questions.

76. I do not wish to let this opportunity pass without expressing, as the representative of Mexico has done (CCD/PV.453, para.36), appreciation of the decision taken by the British Government to ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186, pp.32, 33). Brazil, which has already signed and ratified this Treaty, has always considered that its full implementation requires the indispensable reinforcement of the formal undertaking by the nuclear Powers to respect this area of military denuclearization. That is why we hail the initiative of the United Kingdom, and we reiterate our appeal to nuclear-weapon countries to follow its example, thereby contributing to the consolidation of that Treaty.

77. Finally, with regard to our working methods the Brazilian delegation has an open mind. We believe it would be relatively difficult to innovate substantially; but we will always be ready to co-operate in both formal and informal meetings of this Committee even if such meetings take place more often than in the past. Although we have not specifically in mind the idea of establishing working groups, we will be available for informal contacts with other interested delegations whenever such a procedure may help to expedite the work of the Committee. Probably more important, however, than such mechanism is the spirit that should govern our use of it -- a spirit of co-operation, of respect for the legitimate interests of every country, and of continuous search for balanced and effective solutions.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 457th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Ramiro E. Saraiva Guerreiro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Sweden and Brazil.

"The following document was circulated: Statement of Secretary-General on Occasion of Entry into Force of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on 5 March 1970 (CCD/282).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 17 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

78. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): If the Committee will bear with me for a moment I will raise a point on which some colleagues have approached me. As the members of the Committee are aware, Easter occurs at the end of this month, and there is a feeling amongst many members that the Committee should not meet on either Thursday 26 or Tuesday 31 March. I do not know what is the feeling of the Committee, whether this is the appropriate time at which to raise this point, or if the Committee would prefer to leave a decision until next Tuesday. If there are no objections to the proposal that there should be no meetings of the Committee on 26 and 31 March, I will consider the proposal to be adopted.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.